Land & Water Law Review
Volume 15

Issue 1

Article 4

1980

Public Lands - Problems in Acquiring Access to Public Lands
across Intervening Private Lands - Leo Sheep Co. v. United States
Ann M. Rochelle

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water

Recommended Citation
Rochelle, Ann M. (1980) "Public Lands - Problems in Acquiring Access to Public Lands across Intervening
Private Lands - Leo Sheep Co. v. United States," Land & Water Law Review: Vol. 15 : Iss. 1 , pp. 119 - 137.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol15/iss1/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Land & Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship.

Rochelle: Public Lands - Problems in Acquiring Access to Public Lands acros

PUBLIC LANDS-Problems in Acquiring Access to Public Lands Across Intervening Private Lands. Lea Sheep Co. v. United States, ....... U.S.
99 S.Ct. 1403 (1979).

In December, 1973, the Bureau of Land Management
bladed a dirt road across petitioner Leo Sheep Company's
land to gain access to Seminoe Reservoir, a public area
used for fishing and hunting.' No compensation was offered
nor were condemnation proceedings initiated.' Petitioners,
Leo Sheep Company and Palm Livestock Company, sought
declaratory and injunctive relief under the Quiet Title Act'
against the United States of America, the Secretary of
Interior and the Director of the Bureau of Land Management claiming that the Government had illegally entered
on Leo Sheep Company property.' The United States acknowledged that it had constructed the road' but claimed
it had a legal right to do so because the Union Pacific Act of
18626 contained an implicit reservation of an easement to
cross intervening private lands to reach public lands. To
establish an implicit reservation,' the Government also relied on the common law doctrine of easements by necessity,
the rule construing public land grants in favor of the Government and the corner crossing privilege recognized by the
Unlawful Inclosures of Public Lands Act of 1885.8 The
United States Supreme Court rejected the Government's
arguments and concluded that the Union Pacific Act contained no implicit reservation of access across intervening
private lands to reach public lands,9 that the doctrine of
easements by necessity did not apply to the sovereign,'" that
public land grants should be construed so as not to defeat
the intent of the legislation," and that the Unlawful InCopyright© 1980 by the University of Wyoming

1. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 570 F.2d 881, 884 (10th Cir. 1977).
2. Petition ior Writ of Certiorari at 4, Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, ....

U.S .........
, 99 S.Ct. 1403 (1979).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (1976).
4. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 1, at 883.
5. Id.
6. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 489, as amended, Act of July 2, 1864,
ch. 216, 13 Stat. 356.
7. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, ____ U.S.
, 99 S.Ct. 1403, 1409-13
(1979).
8. 43 U.S.C. § 1061-66 (1976).
9. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 7, at 1409.
10. Id. at 1410.
11. Id. at 1411.
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closures of Public Lands Act did not create a right of access
across private lands to reach public lands.12 The Court held
that the Government must compensate a private landowner
when the United States constructs a road across intervening private lands to reach public lands."
BACKGROUND OF CONFLICT BETWEEN PRIVATE LANDOWNER
AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The conflict between the petitioners and the Bureau
of Land Management had its origins in 1965 with the formation of a corporation known as the Elk Mountain Safari,
Inc."4 A group of ranchers in Carbon County, Wyoming
"pooled their one-third of a million acres of private land""
to form the Elk Mountain Safari, Inc. Pursuant to incorporation and the purpose of providing "recreational opportunities on privately owned lands for the general public
... ,""'the Elk Mountain Safari, Inc. began assessing access
and use fees to the public entering upon and using the
privately owned lands of the rancher incorporators. Signs
requiring a visitor's permit were posted on the borders of
the private lands and a patrol was established to "keep out
all those persons who [did] not want or [could not] afford
to buy an Elk Mountain Safari permit."'
The private lands which comprised the Elk Mountain
Safari, Inc.' 8 included those of petitioners, Leo Sheep
Company and Palm Livestock Company, along with other
area ranchers. Petitioners, as successors in fee from the
Union Pacific Railroad, were the owners of certain oddnumbered sections of land in Carbon County, Wyoming.' 9
12. Id. at 1412.
13. Id. at 1414.
14. Elk Mountain Safari, Inc. was a plaintiff in the present case, but was
withdrawn by a Notice of Dismissal. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
app. 3, Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 2.
15.

ELK MOUNTAIN

SAFARI, INC., ELK MOUNTAIN

SAFARI

LANDS 1

(date un-

known).
16. Articles of Incorporation of Elk Mountain Safari, Inc., Corporation No.
95384, State of Wyoming, February 23, 1965.
17. Farmer, Wyoming's Fee Land Areas, WYOMING WILDLIFE, August, 1968,
at 5.
18. Elk Mountain Safari, Inc. does not own land itself but manages the recreational activities on the lands of various ranches, including petitioners'.
19. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 7, at 1409.
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The Union Pacific Railroad originally acquired the oddnumbered sections of land here involved by a congressional
grant in 1862"0 as a "part of a governmental scheme to sub1
sidize the construction of the transcontinental railroad."'
The land grants made by the 1862 Act included all
the odd-numbered lots within 10 miles on either
side of the track. When the Union Pacific's original subscription drive for private investment
proved a failure, the land grant was doubled by
extending the checkerboard grants to 20 miles
on either side of the track.22
Under this scheme, the United States retained the evennumbered sections.2" A checkerboard configuration resulted
by the reserving of the even-numbered sections as public
domain, and the granting to the railroad of the odd-numbered
sections. 4
To achieve an integrated ranching unit, Leo Sheep
Company acquired the interlocking even-numbered lands
under a Section 3 permit of the Taylor Grazing Act for
general grazing and pasturage." Neither petitioners nor
the Government raised the fact that Leo Sheep Company's
grazing rights on the even-numbered sections were of particular significance. For the purpose of the case, the evennumbered sections were treated as public domain.27
Due to the checkerboard pattern and the lack of public
roads"s in the Seminoe Reservoir area,2 9 access to the Reservoir and other public lands required crossing the private
20. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 489, as amended, Act of July 2, 1864,
ch. 216, 13 Stat. 356.
21. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 7, at 1404-05.
22. Id. at 1408.
23. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 1, at 885.
24. Id.
25. 43 U.S.C. § 315b (1976).
26. Brief for Respondent at 3, Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 7.
27. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 1, at 883.
28. The Hanna-Leo Road, a county road, running more or lees north and
south at the eastern edge of Section 14, Township North, Range 83 West,
6th P.M. (see map) is the notable exception.
29. The Wyoming Recreation Commission had prioritized this area as one
where more public access was needed. WYOMING RECREATION COMMISSION,
WYOMING

ACQUISITION

AND

DEVELOPMENT

FIVE

YEAR

IMPLEMENTATION

PLAN 29 (1972-1977).
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roads"0 of the petitioner. Throughout the latter part of the
1960's and the early 1970's, Wyoming's congressional delegation and the Bureau of Land Management received complaints from the public that access to the federal lands was
being denied" because the Elk Mountain Safari, Inc. was
charging access fees.32 A series of negotiations was conducted between several Elk Mountain Safari, Inc. landowners and the Bureau of Land Management to discuss
different alternatives for increasing public access to Seminoe Reservoir." An impasse was reached.3
In December, 1973, the Bureau of Land Management
constructed an access road to Semince Reservoir across the
SE and SW corners of one section of Leo Sheep Company
property." The Bureau of Land Management also posted
signs encouraging the public to use the road as a route to
the Reservoir."
[BLM] began blading a pre-existing road starting at
a county road in the south half of Section 14, Township North, Range 83 West, 6th P.M., on Bureau of
Land Management lands, continuing westerly across
said Section 14 and crossing the SE corner of Section
15 (fee section of Plaintiff Leo Sheep Company) approximately 30 feet from the Section corner through a
pre-existing cattleguard into Bureau of Land Management Section 22, thence continuing southwesterly approximately 1000 feet where the blading operation departed the pre-existing road and resumed a westerly
course marking a new route to the NW corner of Bureau
of Land Management Section 22 co-terminal with the
SW corner of Plaintiff Leo Sheep Company Section 15,
30. Roads crossing both public and private lands, unless formally dedicated
as public roads, are considered private. See generally: Nixon v. Edwards,
72 Wyo. 274, 264 P.2d 287 (1953) ; Big Horn County Commissioners v.
Hinckley, 593 P.2d 573 (Wyo. 1979).
31. Leo Sheep Co. file, Bureau of Land Management Office, Cheyenne,
Wyoming.
32. Two of the original incorporators of the Elk Mountain Safari, Inc. defended the practice as one which opened up private lands which would
otherwise not be available to the public and as a protection of the wilderness status of the ranches. Ansley, Feds May Need to Buy Land, Casper
Star-Tribune, June 22, 1979, at 21, col. 4, 5, & 6.
33. Leo Sheep Co. file, Bureau of Land Management Office, Cheyenne,
Wyoming.
34. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 7, at 1409.

35. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 1.
36. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 7, at 1409.
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crossing said corner of Section 15 approximately four
feet from said section corner, into Bureau of Land
Management Section 16 and thence bladed westward to
the shore of Seminoe Reservoir."

wHanna-Leo Road

Odd-numbered sections granted to railroad in 1862
and now owned by plaintiff
SEven-numbered sections of public domain
-

-Pre-existing
dirt road
- Pre-existing dirt road improved by B.L.M.
December 1973.
Dirt road relocated by B.L.M. December 1973.88

Petitioners, Leo Sheep Company and Palm Livestock
Company, filed suit in United States District Court for the
District of Wyoming seeking declaratory and injunctive
37. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 1.
38. Id. at 889.
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relief under the Quiet Title Act." The court granted petitioners' motion for summary judgment, concluding that as
a matter of law there was no implied reservation of an
easement nor was there an easement by way of necessity. 0
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
reversed,41 with one judge dissenting. The court held that
the grant of odd-numbered lands to the Union Pacific Railroad included an implied reservation of an easement to pass
over the odd-numbered sections to reach the even-numbered
sections."2
The Supreme Court granted certiorari because this
holding affected property rights in 150 million acres of land
in the western United States.4" The opinion by Mr. Justice
Rehnquist reflected the unanimous decision of the Supreme
Court for reversal of the court of appeals."
THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

The Government used a four-pronged attack in its
argument for a reserved easement authorizing construction
of a public road across Leo Sheep Company land.
Implicit Reservation Under the Union Pacific Act
First, the Government argued that under the Union
Pacific Act, 1 Congress implicitly reserved a right of access
when it granted the odd-numbered sections to the Union
Pacific Railroad and retained the even-numbered sections
as public domain.46
The Government did not claim an
express reservation in the Union Pacific Act.4 It relied on
the findings by the court of appeals that an implied easement of access across the odd-numbered sections to the
even-numbered sections existed.4" The court of appeals
39.

28 U.S.C. § 2409a (1976).

40. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 1.
41. Id. at 888.
42. Id. at 885.
43.

Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 7, at 1409.

44. Id. Justice White took no part in the consideration of the case.
45. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 489, as amended, Act of July 2, 1864,
46.
47.

ch. 216, 13 Stat. 356.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 26, at 9.
Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 7, at 1409.

48.

Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 1, at 885.
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found that the dominant intent behind the Union Pacific Act
"was to 'open up' the West and develop it"" and that the
reservation of an easement of access was necessary to this
goal.5" The Government argued that Congress intended
to reserve access across private lands to enhance the value
of the public lands.5 ' This finding was justified and "[t]o
hold to the contrary would be to ascribe to Congress a degree
of carelessness or lack of foresight"52 which the court of
appeals was unwilling to do."3
The Supreme Court dismissed this argument, saying
that the failure of Congress to expressly reserve an easeThe Court said
ment was conclusive that none existed.
that under the rule of Missouri, Kansas, Texas Railway Co.
v. Kansas Pacific Railway Co.,' if Congress had intended
to reserve an easement for access to the even-numbered sections across the private sections it should have so declared.
Because an easement of access was not one of the specific
reservations under Section 3 of the Union Pacific Act,5 the
Court was unwilling to "divin[e] some 'implicit' congressional intent."5 "
Implicit Reservation Supported by Easement by Necessity
Doctrine
The second argument by the Government was that the
common law doctrine of easements by necessity would support a finding of an implicit reservation in the grant of the
odd-numbered sections of land to the railroad and the retention of the even-numbered sections.5 At common law,
an easement by necessity was found when the owner conveyed a portion of his land in such a manner that it was
49.
50,
51.
52.
.53.54.
55.

Id.

Id.

Brief for Respondent, supra note 26, at 7, 10 & 19.
Id. at 7.
Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 1, at 885.
Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 7, at 1409.
Missouri, Kansas, and Texas Railway Co. v. Kansas Pacific Railway Co.,
97 U.S. 491, 497 (1878).
56. The explicit exceptions include lands sold, reserved, or otherwise disposed
of by the United States; homestead claims and mineral lands. Act of
July 1, 1862, ch. 120, § 3. 12 Stat. 489, as amended, Act of July 2, 1864,
ch. 216, 13 Stat. 356.
57. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 7, at 1409.
58. Id.
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necessary to pass over the granted portion to reach the retained land. 9 As a matter of public policy which sought "to
prevent the remaining land from being nonusable,"6 the
law implied that the parties to the conveyance intended that
an easement of necessity would exist.6 The circumstances,
not the language of the grant, were the basis for inferring
intent.2 Intent was determined at the time of the conveyance."
The Government claimed that:
[i]n the case of the checkerboard pattern it is apparent that the grantor (United States) and
grantee must cross each others land to reach their
own. Furthermore, the need to do so clearly arose
at the time of the conveyance. Thus, it does not
seem unreasonable to conclude that their objective
intent was for the United States to retain an easement to cross the private sections in order to reach
the public sections."4
The Government utilized the objective intent theory
of easements by necessity as an alternative to the agrument
that Congress actually intended to reserve access under the
Union Pacific Act. The Government first argued that Congress had actually, though not expressly, reserved across the
private lands. 5 If the Court did not ascribe such actual intent to Congress and there was no evidence to the contrary,
the Government argued alternatively that Congress objectively intended to reserve a right of way."6
The Supreme Court rejected the Government's easement
by necessity argument by focusing on the elements of necessity and intent. The Court first said there was no necessity because it was not at all clear that the right to construct
a road for public access to a recreational area would be a
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

POWELL, 3 REAL PROPERTY § 410 (1979).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See also, Comment, Access to Public Lands Across Intervening Private
Lands, 8 LAND & WATER L. REV. 149, 162 (1973).
65. Brief for Respondent, supra note 26, at 7, 10 & 19.
66. Id.
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necessity. 7 Secondly, the Court eliminated the element of
necessity by saying that "the 'easement by necessity' doctrine
[was] not available to the sovereign," 8 as the United States
had the power of eminent domain by which to condemn and
acquire access.9
In addressing the question of intent, the Court found
that it was just as likely as not that at the time of the enactment of the Union Pacific Act,7" Congress focused on negotiations and eminent domain as devices for obtaining access.71
With no clear-cut indication of Congressional failure to consider the access question, the Court was "unwilling to imply
rights of way, with the substantial impact that such implicahave on property rights granted over 100 years
tion would
72
ago."
Implicit Reservation Supported by Rule Resolving
Doubts in Government's Favor
The Government urged that in construing grants to federal lands, the rule of Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products
Co. 73 should be followed. Doubts should be resolved for the
Government, not against it."4
The Court placed little credence in the Government's
argument that the rule of Charlestone should be adhered to.75
The Court instead relied on United States v. Denver & Rio
Grande Railway Co.,76 which said that grants are strictly
construed against the grantee, but not as "to defeat the intent of the legislature, or to withhold what is given expressly
or by necessary or fair implication." In the present case, the
Court indirectly indicated that to find for the Government
would be to go against the intent of Congress and the purpose
of the railroad grant.77 The first five pages of the Court's
67.
68.
69.
70.
'71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 7, at 1410.
Id.
Id.
Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 489, as amended, Act of July 2, 1864,
ch. 216. 13 Stat. 356.
Id.
Id.
Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products Co., 436 U.S. 604, 617 (1978).
Id.
Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 7, at 1411.
United States v. Denver & Rio Grande Railway Co., 150 U.S. 1, 14 (1893).
Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 7, at 1411.
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opinion were devoted to the determination that the major
purpose of the Union Pacific Act was to find an incentive
for the construction of a transcontinental railway.78 All attempts were made to make the land grant scheme attractive
to the Union Pacific Railroad." The Court suggested that
retention of an access easement would not have furthered
this goal and would have promoted uncertainty and unpredictability in land titles." The Court indirectly rejected the
Government's argument, adopted by the court of appeals,
that the major purposes of the railroad grant were to open
up the West by assuring access,8 ' enhance the values of the
retained lands82 and only incidentally help the railroads."
Implicit Reservation as Established by the Unlawful
Inclosures of Public Lands Act
The Government's final argument was that by congressional enactment of the Unlawful Inclosures of Public Lands
Act,8" (hereinafter cited as Act) Congress reaffirmed the
implicit reservation of an easement under the checkerboard
The Act prohibited all enclosures of
land grant scheme.8
public lands by persons having no claim or color of title;
the maintenance, construction, or control of such an enclosure; and the assertion of the right of exclusive use without claim or color of title. 6 Under the Act, it was also
illegal to prevent or obstruct a person from peaceably entering upon or passing over public land by force, threat,
intimidation, fencing or other unlawful means.8 7
The Supreme Court, in Camfield v. United States,'
construed the Act as prohibiting fences built on private
land which worked as an enclosure of public lands. 89 The
Id. at 1404-1408.
79. Id.
78.

Id. at 1413-14.
Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 1, at 885.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 26, at 7-8.
Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 1, at 885.
Act of Feb. 25, 1885, ch. 149, 23 Stat. 321-22, as amended 43 U.S.C. §§
1061-66 (1976).
85. Brief for Respondent, supra note 26, at 22.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

86. 43 U.S.C. § 1061 (1976).

87. 43 U.S.C. § 1063 (1976).
88. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
89. Id. at 525.
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Court said, "(i) t is only by treating it as prohibiting all 'enclosures' of public lands, by whatever means, that the act
(Emphasis added.) Following
becomes of any avail."9
the reasoning of Camfield v. United States, the Government
argued that petitioner Leo Sheep Company's refusal to allow
access over any section corner to reach the enterlocking
public lands operated effectively as an enclosure."
The Court rejected the argument by first saying that
the Act was a specific remedy for a specific wrong, the
range war situation, and had little significance to the reserved easement situation." Second, the Court found the
case of Camfield v. United States to have limited application
to the question of right of access because the case was deterThird, Camfield v.
mined on the basis of nuisance law.
United States affirmed the grantee's right to fence completely his own land and thus deny access if he did so withThe Court
out the intent of so enclosing the public lands.'
seemed to indicate that the element of intent controlled the
question of lawfulness. Fourth, the Secretary of Interior95
assumed that access rights would have to be purchased
under the checkerboard land pattern. 6 Such a presumption
meant the Act did not apply to the question of right of
access.
EFFECTS OF THE DECISION

The Court's decision is not so unsettling in its outcome as it is in the method used to reach that outcome.
It would be understandable if a fair balancing of the policy
reasons behind the ranchers' and the Government's arguments had been pursued and a determination made that
the equities rested with the ranchers. The Court, however,
addressed the Government's arguments in a purely mechanical fashion. The Court's analysis went no further than to
establish-such maxims as the failure to expressly reserve
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 26, at 25.
Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 7, at 1416.
Id. at 1412.
Id.
1 REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR FOR FIsCAL YEAR ENDING
JUNE 3, 1887, at 15 (1887).
96. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 7, at 1413.
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an easement was conclusive that none existed,"7 eminent
domain is an alternative to easements by necessity,98 and
the Unlawful Inclosures of Public Lands Act only applied
to range war situations." The Court should have addressed
the court of appeals' holding that the absence of an express
reservation in the patent did not negate the implied reservation,1 0' the Government's argument that eminent domain
was not a feasible alternative to an easement by necessity,'
and the opinion of the Wyoming Supreme Court in United
States v. Douglas-Willan Sartoris Co.' 2 that the Unlawful
Inclosures Act spoke to the question of access:
Is it the law or the fence which secures to the owner
of property its exclusive enjoyment? The fence is
The
made for beasts; the law is made for man ....
of
access
to
facility
what
greater
fence destroyed,
have
than
if
the
public
sections
will
retained
the
the fence had been mended? When reduced to its
last and true legal analysis, the point in controversy
is, shall the United States have a way over the defendant's land?
In addition to addressing these questions, the Court should
have balanced the policy considerations behind the Government's arguments that there is a strong public policy favoring land utilization' ° against the ranchers' concern for
certainty and predictability in their land titles." 4
Access to Public Lands Within the Checkerboard Region
In the wake of the Supreme Court decision, the Bureau
of Land Management must compensate petitioner Leo Sheep
Company for lands taken when the road was constructed
across petitioner's land.0 5 The road did open up access to
one public section of Seminoe Reservoir, but the practice
of assessing access and use fees by the Elk Mountain Safari,
Id. at 1409.
Id. at 1410.
Id. at 1411.
Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 1, at 888.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 26, at 13.
United States v. Douglas-Willan Sartoris Co., 3 Wyo. 287, 22 P. 92, 97
(1889).
103. Powell, supra note 51, at § 410.
104. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 7, at 1413.
105. Id. at 1414.
97.
. 98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
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Inc. continues on remaining sections of private lands where
the roads have not been dedicated to public use."0 6
The question remains: How is the Government to assure public access to public lands when a group like Elk
Mountain Safari, Inc. charges access and use fees to cross
the private lands to reach the public lands? If access is
not acquired, the public will be forced to pay such fees or be
denied access across private lands to reach the public lands.
The injustice of of the situation and the dilemma which faces
the Bureau of Land Management in light of such a practice
is well summarized in the statement of one Wyoming resident, "It's not the cost, it's the idea that we have to pay for
our public lands."' 7 According to one Bureau of Land
Management spokesman, "The results [of the case] are
tragic and bad as far as use of the land by the public."' '
The Bureau of Land Management is not without recourse in acquiring access to public lands across the intervening private lands. The decision makes it clear that
the Government can use its power of eminent domain to
acquire access.' 1° The feasibility of this alternative was
characterized by the Government during the course of the
trial as being "unreasonable and unworkable."' . ° The
Bureau of Land Management has said it will employ the
method of buying access to public lands but has also indicated
"[i]t is not high on the bureau's priority list, however ....
[I]t's a horribly involved thing to get access into each
sector.'
In general, the Bureau of Land Management can look
to the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, "1
(hereinafter cited as FLPMA) as its source of eminent domain power. FLPMA provides the Secretary of Interior with
authority to acquire access to public lands by "purchase, exchange, donation or eminent domain" subject to specified
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Ansley, supra note 82, at 21.
Id.
Id.
Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 7, at 1410.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 26, at 13.
Ansley, supra note 32, at 21.
43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-82 (1976).
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provisions." 3 The Bureau of Land Management can also
utilize the Department of Interior's annual appropriation
act.. 4 in conjunction with the condemnation power of 40
U.S.C. § 257 (1976) to acquire eminent domain power. The
appropriation act authorizes construction of roads and other
projects while 40 U.S.C. § 257 (1976) contains powers of
condemnation for projects which are authorized. Laws for
specific purposes or regions of the country should also be consulted, as they may contain powers of eminent domain.
In addition to eminent domain, the Government can
look to its powers of conditioning Taylor Grazing Act permits and leases as a means of acquiring access to the public
" ' A strong argulands across the intervening private lands.11
ment can be advanced that the Government has the authority
to require that a landowner allow the public across his private
lands to reach adjacent public lands before the Government
issues a grazing permit for the public lands. FLPMA provides that permits and leases can be made
subject to such terms and conditions as the Secretary concerned deems appropriate and consistent
with the governing law, including, but not limited
to, the authority of the Secretary concerned to cancel, suspend, or modify a grazing permit or lease,
in whole or in part, pursuant to the terms and con116
ditions thereof, ....
The ability to impose conditions, specifically for recreational
or other non-agricultural uses, comes from the language of
the Taylor Grazing Act itself and from the multiple use
concept of FLPMA. The Taylor Grazing Act declares that
nothing in the subchapter on public lands in the lower 48
states and Hawaii shall be:
construed as in any way altering or restricting the
right to hunt or fish within a grazing district in accordance with the laws of the United States or of
113. 43 U.S.C. § 1516 (1976).
114. This is a yearly act in which the Interior Department budgets for certain
projects including road construction. For latest appropriation see: Authorizations-Department of the Interior and Related Agencies, Pub. L. No.
95-465 (1978).
115. 43 U.S.C. § 1752 (1976).
116. Id.
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any State, or as vesting in any permittee any right
whatsoever to interfere with hunting or fishing
within a grazing district." 7
The regulations promulgated pursuant to the Taylor Grazing
Act declare that administration of livestock grazing on
public lands shall be consistent with the multiple use concepts under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
of 1976.118 FLPMA includes outdoor recreation as one of
the uses for which the public lands shall be managed.119 The
broad legislative grant of regulatory power for enforcing
FLPMA, 12 0 coupled with the above-mentioned laws, provides
the conceptual framework for an argument that the Government can pass regulations conditioning a rancher's Taylor
Grazing Act rights with a requirement that he allow access
to the public lands across his lands. If a rancher rejects
such conditions and does not accept a permit or lease, then
the Government can use its eminent domain powers to gain
access to public lands across the rancher's land.
The Unlawful Inclosures of Public Lands Act
The Supreme Court determined that the Unlawful In(hereinafter cited as Act)
closures of Public Lands Act,'
confers no right to cross private lands to reach public lands. 2
The role to which the Act has now been relegated is twofold.
First, the Court seems to indicate that the Act will
have significance if the landowner intentionally encloses his
lands so as to deny access to public lands.' 3 The Court
quoted Camfield v. United States" to say that if a landowner
under the guise of enclosing his own land,.., builds
a fence which is useless for the purpose, and can
only have been intended to enclose the lands of the
Government, he is plainly within the statute, and
is guilty of an unwarrantable appropriation of
that which belongs to the public at large.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

43 U.S.C. § 315 (1976).
43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-2 (1978).
43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976).
43 U.S.C. § 1733 (1976).
43 U.S.C. § 1061-66 (1976).
Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 7, at 1411-13.
Id. at 1412.
Camfield v. United States, supra note 88, at 528.
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In the above situation, the fence would be torn down because
of the landowner's intent to keep the public off the public
lands. The livestock would be allowed to cross to the public
domain if a "fence out" statute was involved, as in Camfield
v. United States. However, the victory would be small.
Under the Leo Sheep Company decision, there would be no
right of access for the public at large, but only for livestock.2 1
The size of the victory is further diminished in that the days
of the open range are gone. The only one who would be entitled to graze his cattle on the particular public section would
be the one holding a grazing permit under the Taylor Grazing
Act."2 6 Clearly, the element of intent does little to revive
the import of the Act.
The second role which the Act plays is not diminished by the Court's decision. The Act would apply
to a situation in which there is no intervening private lands
question but where a private party unlawfully builds a fence
or where a permittee under the Taylor Grazing Act
is authorized to build a fence on public lands, and
the public is authorized to enter upon and use the
same lands. When a member of the public is unlawfully excluded from such lands by locked gates,
no trespassing signs, or intimidation the Act provides an obviously desirable remedy.'"
Easement by Necessity
The Court handled the question of easement by necessity
by saying that access to recreational areas did not represent
a necessity and that eminent domain was an alternative to
the common law."2 8 The Court went no further in its analysis
than to establish these two maxims.
There are two fallacies in the Court's dismissal of a
recreational use as not being a necessity. First, the actual
issue is one of ingress and egress, not type of use. The
Bureau of Land Management had no route except across
petitioner's land by which to reach the public land. Access
125.
126.
127.
128.

Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 7, at 1411-13.
43 U.S.C. § 315, 315a-315r (1976).
Comment, supra note 64, at 159.
Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 7, at 1410.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol15/iss1/4

16

Rochelle: Public Lands - Problems in Acquiring Access to Public Lands acros

1980

CASE NOTES

135

across the petitioner's land was necessary, regardless of the
type of use on the public land. Secondly, outdoor recreation
is recognized by the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act,"' ° as one of the multiple uses for which the public lands
are managed. Prior to the passage of FLPMA, the Taylor
Grazing Act'3 ° recognized the public's right to hunt and
fish on public lands. It seems a blatant mistake to dismiss
access to recreational areas as not being a necessity when
the Bureau of Land Management is charged with managing the public lands for such a purpose.
Another shortcoming in the Court's opinion is its failure
to adequately address whether or not eminent domain proceedings are a feasible alternative to the doctrine of easements by necessity. The Court never considered the Government's argument that to require the use of eminent domain
proceedings in all of the checkerboard lands was "unreasonable and unworkable" ' ' and therefore not really a viable
alternative to the doctrine of easements by necessity. The
fact that the Government would have to initiate thousands
of suits to acquire access 2 to its lands hardly seems to be the
equivalent to a right which vests one with an easement by
the circumstances of the conveyance.
In addition to discussing the shortcomings of the
Court's opinion in regard to easements by necessity, it is
appropriate to examine future applications of the doctrine.
The Court's decision leaves unanswered the applicability of
the doctrine to two situations, use by states against the federal government, and use by private parties against the federal government.
The question arises: Does a state have an easement by
necessity if its lands are entirely surrounded by federal
lands? Eminent domain as an alternative to the easement
by necessity doctrine was crucial to the Court's decision in
the present case."' In this hypothetical, the state, being the
inferior sovereign, has no power of eminent domain against
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

43 U.S.C.
43 U.S.C.
Brief for
Id. at 12.
Leo Sheep

§§ 1701-82 (1976).
§ 315, 315a-315r (1976).
Respondent, supra note 26, at 13.
Co. v. United States, supra note 7, at 1410.
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the United States. Following the Supreme Court's thinking
in the present case, the state can demonstrate the element of
necessity by its lack of eminent domain proceedings. It follows that an easement by necessity should be found. " 4
Another context in which the easement by necessity
argument might arise would be the reverse fact situation of
the present case. Suppose petitioners wanted access to their
private lands across the intervening public lands. Do the
private landowners have an easement by necessity? Under
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act,' 35 proceedings
can be initiated by private parties to acquire rights of way
The element of necessity for private
over public lands.'
parties disappears in the wake of FLPMA's procedures for
granting rights of way. Petitioners, however, could argue
that their easements are a property right which vested at
the time of the grant and that the subsequent enactment of
the FLPMA in 1976 does not apply to petitioners. FLPMA
specifies that it will have no effect on existing rights of
way." 7 Petitioners could argue that to require compliance
with FLPMA for acquiring a right of way is a "taking"
of a vested right without just compensation."' The route the
courts will choose in deciding the taking issue is not clear. 3 '
CONCLUSIONS

The Bureau of Land Management is not totally without remedy in its efforts to acquire access to public lands
across intervening private lands. It can rely on its powers
of eminent domain and its powers to define the terms under
which grazing permits will be issued.
The Unlawful Inclosure ef Public Lands Act has been
rendered meaningless in a determination of the question of
access over intervening private lands to reach public lands.
134. This discussion does not purport to be a thorough analysis of the situation
or the route which courts should follow. It is only suggestive of an argument which arises as a result of the Court's decision in this case.
135. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-82 (1976).
136. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1761-1771 (1976).
137. 43 U.S.C. § 1769 (1976).
138. U.S. CONST. amend V.
139.

NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 440-450
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The Court's analysis was purely mechanical and lacking in a balancing of policy considerations. This shortcoming was especially obvious in the Court's treatment of the
doctrine of easement by necessity. The application of the
doctrine to parties other than the United States is still an
open question.
ANN
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